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Abstract 
The principal contribution of this article is that it provides evidence of recent trends of 
inequality in Guyana, but the article goes beyond this and describes the evolution of 
inequality since 1974 to 2013. This is done within a Kaleckian framework to derive profit 
and wage rates, since recent Gini coefficients data are absent. The evidence implies 
that inequality is on the rise. The article argues that the mining and quarrying sector 
regulates Guyana’s growth performance and ignites growth in the non-tradable services 
sector, which are characterized by low-wage-low-employment opportunities. Thus, a 
greater share of the gains in income in these sectors goes to profits when growth is 
sustained. 
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1   Introduction 
In many poor and developing countries, data on inequality are either absent or 
dated -this makes research on inequality and distributional conflicts uncommon. This 
article uses a Kaleckian framework to overcome these difficulties. Specifically, it 
employs Kalecki’s profit equation and annual growth rate data to estimate annual wage 
rates. The dynamics between profit and wage rates are used to determine the evolution 
of inequality in Guyana – a small and open economy.  
 The evidence suggests that inequality is on the rise in Guyana even as per capita 
income increases. Exclusive focus on poverty rates is typical of many developing 
countries, but what is the point of helping the most vulnerable in society today, if we 
dam them to poverty tomorrow? Gross inequality of income creates disparities in wealth 
and consequently, reduces the equality of opportunity in a society. Accumulated wealth 
is a significant determinant of future income (Piketty 2014), and the principal reason 
why developing countries must include distributional conflicts in their policy matrix.  
 Although inequality is under-researched in Guyana, Gafar (2004) and Khemraj 
(2013) have undertaken empirical and theoretical studies respectively. Gafar (2004) 
contends that growth in Guyana has no relationship with inequality, especially since the 
Gini coefficient has remained relatively stable during the years 1993-1999. This is 
contrary to the contention in this article. Gafar (2004) time series is limited; therefore, 
any definitive conclusion on the relationship between growth and distribution in Guyana 
would be premature. The advantage of this article is that it traces the evolution of 
inequality in Guyana from 1974-2013; the evidence proves that growth and wage rates 
are highly correlated. Although Gafar (2004) explains that Guyana experienced 
marginal reductions of inequality during 1993-1999, this article labels this experience as 
a recovery, in light of a deterioration of inequality in the previous decade. Khemraj 
(2013) proposes that the elected oligarchy in Guyana constructs an uneven income 
growth between the principal ethnicities. Although this article does not investigate the 
political economy underpinnings of distributional conflicts, it is likely that the majority of 
the profit earners are those in the ethnic group with the greatest political power.  
 The evolution of inequality in Guyana has been one of deterioration (1974-1984), 
recovery (1985-1995), improvement (1996-2006) and further deterioration in recent 
years (2007-2013). From this perspective Gini coefficients would indicate marginal 
gains in the distribution of income or stability as Gafar (2004) explains. But the 
Kaleckian approach goes deeper and highlights the implications of growth on wages 
and profits. But what is the cause of the recent rise of inequality in Guyana? The article 
explains that sustained growth of non-tradable services permits profits to gain a greater 
share of a growing pie. Most of the services industry in Guyana is characterized by low-
wage-low-employment intensive opportunities, thus, growth in these conditions increase 
inequality.  
 Unlike the rich literature on Guyana’s growth performance, this articles places 
significant explanatory power in the mining and quarrying sector. The apparent 
consensus in the literature is that political economy considerations are the principal 
determinants of Guyana’s economic performance. This article presents evidence that 
illustrates the simultaneous but coincidental change in gold prices and political regimes.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the Kaleckian 
approach to inequality. Section 3 provides a critical but brief review of Guyana’s growth 
literature, while section 4 discusses the evolution of inequality in Guyana. Section 5 
examines the source of the recent rise of inequality and section 6 concludes.  
2   A Kaleckian Approach to Inequality 
Equation (1) is the national income accounting identity with a government sector 
and an open economy. National income, consumption, investment, government 
spending and net exports are Y ,  C,  I ,  G  and X −M( ) respectively. Equation (2) further 
disaggregates national income Y( ) into profits P( )and wages W( ).  
Equation 1( )  Y  =  C  +  I  +  G  +  X −M( ).
Equation 2( )  Y  =  W  +  P( )  =  C  +  I  +  G  +  X −M( ).
 
Kalecki (1942) showed the world how laissez faire capitalism disempowers labor 
and empowers capital. Although this argument is age old, see Marx (1990), [1867]), 
Kalecki used national income identities to make his point. In his original formulation, 
Kalecki assumed a closed economy, no public sector and that all wages are spent. This 
leads us to the following formulation: 
Equation 3( )  Y  =  W  +  P =  C1 +  C2 +  I ,  
where C1  and C2  are consumption out of wages and profits respectively. 
Equation 4( )  W  +  P =  C1 +  C2 +  I . 
                    − C1       − C1  
Since Kalecki assumes that all wages are spent: W  = C1, when we subtract C1  
from both sides of equation (4) we are left with equation (5) - this is Kalecki’s famous 
profit equation. 
Equation 5( )  P =  C2 +  I .
Equation 6( )  W  =  C1.
 
Equations (5) and (6) led Kalecki to claim that workers spend what they earn, but 
capitalists earn what they spend. This is the inherently unequal relationship between 
profits and wages or labor and capital. Equation (7) illustrates the equilibrium condition 
when national savings NS( ) are equal to investment (I). Equation (8) simply 
disaggregates national savings into savings from wages s1W( )and profits s2P( ),where 
s1  and s2  are the average propensity to save from W  and P  respectively: note that s1  
is not equal to s2.  
Equation 7( )  NS  =  I .
Equation 8( )s1W  + s2P =  I .
 
                    −s1W             −s1W  
Equation (8) allows us to find the rate of profit P( ) : when we subtract s1W  from both 
sides of equation (8), the following remains: 
Equation 9( )s2P =  I  − s1W .  
                    /s2     /s2  
Then we divide both sides of equation (9) by s2 ; equation (10) illustrates the rate of 
profit P( ) : 
Equation 10( )  P =  (I  − s1W ) / s2. 
Keeping Kaleck’s assumption that all wages are spent W = C1( ) , savings out of wages 
must be equal to zero s1W  =  0( ) , therefore, the rate of profit P( ) is: 
Equation 11( )  P =  I  / s2. 
Although this profit rate was derived from a closed economy without any public 
sector, this derivation holds when the model is generalized to an open economy with a 
government sector. Equation (12) illustrates the equilibrium condition when injections 
are balanced with leakages, but generalized to an open economy (exports X( )  and 
imports   M( ) ) with a government G( ) : 
Equation 12( )  NS  +  T  +  M  =  I  +  G  +  X. 
−T   −M        −T   −M  
Subtracting taxes T( )and imports M( ) from both sides of equation (12) leads us to the 
following: 
Equation 13( )  NS  =  I  +  G −T( )  +  (X −M )  
This can be rewritten as 
Equation 14( )s1W  + s2P =  I  +  G −T( )  +  X −M( ).  
Solving for the rate of profit (P) requires us to subtract both sides of equation (14) by 
s1W  and then divide both sides by s2 . The rate of profit (P) equals: 
Equation 15( )  P =  (I  +  G −T( )  +  X −M( )  − s1W ) / s2.  
Note carefully that I  +  G -T( )  +  X -M( )  -  s1W( )  is the same as 
C  +  I  +  G  +  X −M( ), where C  =  s1W . Since the rate of profit (P) and savings rate 
(s2 )  are in rate forms, C  +  I  +  G  +  X −M( ) also needs to be transformed into rate 
form. The rate form of C  +  I  +  G  +  X −M( ) is the growth rate g( ) of the overall 
economy. Thus, the rate of profit P( ) could be generalized, where g( ) is the rate of 
growth of the overall economy and s( ) is the savings rate  - see equation (16).  
Equation 16( )  P =  g / s.  
Therefore, the wage rate W( )can be calculated as follows: 
Equation 17( )  W  =  g −  P.  
2.1  Dynamics of Wage and Profit rates and Wage and Profit shares 
Wage rate W( )and profit rate P( )are different from wage share (α )and profit share 
(1−α ) . The ratio of wages to national income is the wage share (α) and the ratio of 
profits to national income is the profit share (1−α ) . Note carefully that α + (1−α ) = 1.  
For illustrative purposes, let’s assume that the wage share is 0.6 and the profit share is 
0.4. When the profit rate P( )and the wage rate W( )are the same, the profit and wage 
shares of 0.4 and (0.6) remain the same. In other words, income distribution/inequality 
remains the same. When W  >  P , inequality declines and wage share increases 
relatively faster than profit share. Conversely, when P >  W , inequality increases and 
profit share in national income rises faster than wage share. These analytics are used to 
determine the evolution of inequality in Guyana; since recent inequality data (Gini 
coefficient) are absent, except for years 1992, 1993, 1999 and 2006.  
The Kaleckian approach permits the author to determine directly, whether growth 
in Guyana is inclusive or not. It is an invaluable approach to the study of income 
distribution in countries that have poor data collection institutions. Due to the paucity of 
data on inequality in Guyana, studies that empirically investigate distributional issues 
are lacking. Therefore, this article is an essential update on distributional conflicts and 
the first study to employ the Kaleckian approach to study of inequality in Guyana.  
Gafar (2004) seeks to ascertain the relationship among market reforms, poverty 
reduction and inequality in Guyana. The essential conclusion is that inequality (as 
measured by the Gini coefficient) has remained relatively stable between the years 
(1993-1999), where its Gini coefficient has marginally declined from 0.467 to 0.421. 
Consequently, Gafar (2004) infers that growth in Guyana does not increase or decrease 
inequality, although, it reduces poverty. Stable wage and profit shares in Guyana 
necessitate stable wage and profit rates, but the evidence presented in this article 
illustrates a highly volatile wage rate.  
The ability to look beyond Gini coefficients and uncover the dynamics between 
wage and profit rates is an additional benefit of the Kaleckian approach. The latter does 
explain stable income distribution in Guyana between (1974-1999), but it offers new 
insights that could not be discerned using Gini coefficients. The period (1974-1984) was 
characterized by substantial increases of inequality, but fortunately, the following period 
(1985-1995) experienced a full recovery. In aggregate, the period (1974-1995) was one 
of relatively stable income inequality, but the Kaleckian approach adopted in this essay, 
reveals that the stability of income distribution was because of a deterioration and then 
a recovery in the distribution of income. Since recent data on inequality are absent, 
Gafar (2004) is limited because its analysis terminates in the year (1999). The 
advantage of this article is that it is able to trace the evolution of inequality in Guyana 
from 1974 to 2013. 
On a theoretical front, Khemraj (2013) advances the thesis that an uneven 
income growth is the inevitable end in Guyana when the electoral outcome is fixed by 
ethnic/race voting. Although the popular studies on inequality (Stiglitz (2012) and Piketty 
(2014)) emphasize the differences of income between wages and profits, Khemraj 
(2013) underscores the income differences between the two primary ethnicities (Afro-
Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese) in Guyana. While Gafar (2004) calls for pro-poor growth 
policies and less redistribution, Khemraj (2013) advocates for constitutional reform to 
hedge against the tendencies of oligarchies to deliberately increase inequality. 
Unlike Gafar (2004), this article contends that there is a strong nexus between 
growth and distribution in Guyana – more specifically, wages and profits. This article 
does not investigate the latent ethnic conflict that beset Guyana’s political economy, but 
a casual juxtaposition of this with the evolution of wage and profit rates in Guyana, 
reveals that the ethnic group with the greatest political power would be the profit 
earners. Thus, increasing inequality in Guyana could easily mean rising inequality 
between the two principal ethnicities.  
3   A Critical Review of the Existing Literature 
Table 1 displays a brief review of various studies that sought to explain Guyana’s 
economic performance. It is clear that most agree that the source of Guyana’s poor 
economic growth is directly related to internal political turmoil, while Grenade and Pasha 
(2011) explained the growth recovery through improved governance among other 
things. Although this paper sides with the terms of trade argument it is important to 
interrogate the political economy considerations. 
Table 1 
Various Explanations of 
Guyana’s Economic 
Performance. 
Various Studies 
Governance/Political Economy Troubles 
Singh (2013), Khemraj (2013) Staritz et 
al (2007), Grenade and Lewis - Bynoe 
(2011) and Grenade and Pasha (2011). 
Geography DaCosta (2007). 
Macroeconomic Management Grenade and Lewis-Bynoe (2011) and Grenade and Pasha (2011). 
Terms of Trade Grenade and Pasha (2011), Weisman (2003). 
Poor Inter-sectoral Linkages Khemraj et al (2013). 
Poor Financial Intermediation Khemraj (2009). 
Debt Weisman (2003). 
Source: Author’s representation 
For instance, Singh (2013) ran a number of regressions to determine the 
principal factors that matter for Guyana’s growth. Among his significant variables, 
political regimes (PPP1 and PNC2) proved to be statistically significant for growth. But 
we must take great caution with how we interpret the results from mechanical 
regressions. The change in growth performance in Guyana is so dramatic between 
different political regimes that the regression analysis will include these political regimes 
                                                
1 People’s Progressive Party 
2 People’s National Congress 
as significant growth determinants. But as Figures 2 and 11 highlight, the change in 
gold prices is a better explanation of Guyana’s economic performance. 
Much of the political turmoil that Guyana experienced during the 2000s is used to 
explain its turbulent growth performance in these years. But when one looks at the gold 
price in Figure 11 for the same years, one notices that there were little growth in the 
price of gold, in fact, gold prices actually declined. This story of poor growth in the price 
of gold mirrors negative growth rates in the mining sector for corresponding years (see 
Figure 2).  
It is clear in Figures 2 and 6 below that the rate of growth of the mining and 
quarrying sector is an outlier. This means that its growth rate will significantly affect the 
overall growth rate of the economy. When its growth rate is above the average growth 
rate of the other sectors, the economy’s growth rate will increase. Conversely, when its 
growth rate is below the average growth rate of the other sectors, it will tend to pull the 
economy’s growth rate downwards. This gives credence to the terms of trade 
explanation listed in Table 1 and thus, overshadows the political economy explanations. 
With poor and turbulent growth it is unlikely that any analysis will find strong inter-
sectoral linkages among the various sectors in Guyana. Although, as this paper 
explains, growth in the services industry is a direct result of growth in the mining and 
quarrying sector.  
Since Guyana benefited from a Multi - Lateral Debt Relief initiative in 2006 one 
may claim that lower debt levels is the cause of growth. But Figure 11 illustrates a spike 
in the price of gold in that specific year, which results in corresponding increases in the 
growth and profit rates in the mining and quarrying sector in Guyana. Figures 2 and 4 
corroborate this story. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) concludes that when debt to GDP 
ratios rise above 90% growth rates become negative - a striking conclusion. But this 
was an erroneous conclusion as Herndon et al (2013) highlight, the authors explain that 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) had coding errors in their data and criticized them for using 
unconventional weighting and excluding data. When these errors were corrected the 
debt-doom relationship literally disappeared. Thus, instead of high debt leading to poor 
growth, the causation is reversed.  
Sound macroeconomic management will always remain a necessary condition 
for growth, but by itself it is in sufficient to ignite the growth process. Although foreign 
investors look keenly at various countries macro stance, there are other equally or more 
important variables that they take into consideration. Most critically: infrastructure 
development, human capital development, natural resource endowment etc., if these 
are lacking and a nation has a good macro stance this would matter little to prospective 
investors.  
High interest rate spreads in the banking sector is conventionally understood as 
an indication of poor financial intermediation, but Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) contend that 
this state of credit market disequilibrium could be efficient. The authors explain that 
when information is imperfect about the credit worthiness of potential borrowers high 
spreads are needed to cover the costs incurred in searching for information to reduce 
this asymmetry. Secondly, borrowers that are less likely to repay are usually the first 
loan applicants, therefore, interest rate spreads that cover search costs to reduce 
information asymmetry are likely to reduce adverse selection and non - performing 
loans. Essentially, interest rate spreads in Guyana’s banking sector may not necessarily 
reflect poor financial intermediation but prudent banking practices. 
4   Evolution of Inequality in Guyana 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of profit and wage rates from 1974 to 2013 in 
Guyana. This time period is divided into four (4) periods (A, B, C, D), where A, B and C 
are a decade each, while period D spans only six (6) years. Guyana’s rate of economic 
growth is not included in Figure 1 but it is important to indicate that it is highly correlated 
with the evolution of wage rates, except in the latter years in period D. Essentially; wage 
rates are the greatest casualty of poor growth and the greatest beneficiary during the 
recovery phase of period B. 
The white bars indicate increasing wage share relative to profit share, while the 
grey bars are indicative of rising inequality or rising profit share relative to wage share. It 
is obvious that in recent years the distribution of income has worsened, as is indicative 
by the growing grey bars in the last few years. The marginal reduction of inequality that 
Gafar (2004) alluded to is depicted by the sizable white bars in the period of (1990-
1996). But note carefully that this improvement in the distribution of income follows a 
period of substantial increases of inequality. A careful examination of Figure 1 
illuminates the violent changes in wage rates that would be hidden in Gini coefficients. 
As was explained earlier, wage and growth rates are highly correlated, which means 
that the relationship between growth and the distribution of income is significant, 
contrary to Gafar (2004).  
 
Figure 1. Evolution of Inequality 
Data Source: World Bank 
4.1  Period A: Labor’s Lost Decade (1974-1984) 
The average growth rate (or lack there of) for this period was approximately (-
0.94%). It is obvious from the graph that the greatest casualty of poor growth is labor; 
somehow profits manage to stay alive. This brings out an important point that Keynes 
(1930) highlighted: he argued that profit is like the widow’s cruse (from the bible) that is 
never depleted, even in downturns. The great recession in the USA is a modern day 
example of profits having the upper hand - see Stiglitz (2012) and Piketty (2014) of how 
the great recession has worsened already high inequality and prolongs the recovery. 
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Average profit and wage rates are: (0.13%) and (-1. 07%) respectively, thus, profit rate 
grew on average (0.9%) faster than wages. The consequence of this is increased 
inequality. This means that growth in the next decade must increase per capita income 
and ensure that most of the gains in income go to wages to advance a recovery. 
Indeed, Guyanese labor has lost the battle in this decade.  
 
4.2  Period B: A Tale of Recovery (1985-1995) 
The average profit and wage rates in this period were (0.16%) and (2.2%) 
respectively, wages have exceeded profits by an average of (2%) per year. A genuine 
recovery in the distribution of income in Guyana. Note carefully that the author wishes to 
differentiate between recovery and reductions of inequality. Taking into consideration 
the worsening of inequality during the previous decade, this period was a recovery; 
unlike the contention of Gafar (2004), who argues that this period experienced 
reductions of inequality. An average growth rate of (2.3%) characterized this period and 
based on the recovery of inequality, this has been a decade of inclusive growth. It is 
remarkable how a mere decade could be so inclusive that the erosion of the wage share 
in the previous decade can be conquered. 
4.3  Period C: Genuine Reductions of Inequality: Good Luck or Good 
Policy? (1996-2006) 
Unlike a steady rise in the wage rate during the recovery phase, wage rates have 
been highly volatile in this decade, while profit rates remain steady. Average growth was 
(2.06%), while average profit and wage rates were (0.37%) and (1.68%) respectively. 
Indicating that on average, wages rose (1.31%) faster than profits - a genuine reduction 
of inequality in Guyana. This is no small achievement, most countries in the world 
cannot boast of two decades of perpetual improvement in the distribution of income. It is 
important to highlight though, that the rate of growth in this period is lower than in the 
recovery phase and the rate of reduction of inequality is lower in this decade than in the 
previous. Fundamentally, inequality decreased at declining rates.  
 
 
 
4.4  Period D: A Reversal of Fortune (2007-2013) 
This period is not a full decade, it only accounts for 2007 to 2013 – however, 
more than half of a decade. This is Guyana’s best period thus far; average growth 
stands strong at (4.4%). Wage rates grew by an average of (1.99%) and profit rates 
recorded an average increase of (2.38%). A reversal of fortune, profit rates grew 
(0.39%) faster than wage rates. Two points are vital:  
• These years witness the return of inequality and  
•  It is rising at a much slower pace than inequality has declined in the two 
previous decades.  
While the latter point may comfort some, it is a cause for concern that in the 
period of strongest growth, the distribution of income has deteriorated. Although all 
boats float, the tide is elevating some boats faster than others. Instead of consolidating 
the gains made in Period C, Guyana’s growth explosion has disproportionately 
benefited profits or capitalists - that small group that manages to stay afloat during 
hurricanes (Period A) and even appropriate a greater share in income when the tide is 
steady (Period D). The widow’s cruse indeed!  
4.5  A Brief Synopsis 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (2011-2015) explains that inequality 
has declined between 1992 and 2006; this is consistent with the recovery phase and the 
genuine reductions of inequality period highlighted above. Specifically, the PRSP (2011-
2015) contends that the Gini coefficient has declined from 0.44 to 0.35 - a reduction by 
0.09. This gain is presently under threat as the reversal of fortune period underscores.  
Period B is the best performing decade in terms of reductions of inequality, 
except it was a recovery. Actual reductions of inequality in Period C were relatively less 
spectacular. Unfortunately, Period D is chipping away at these gains. Although absolute 
income increases during Period D, income disparities are widening and this is a cause 
for concern. The reduction of inequality in Period C seems to be more good luck than 
good policy. Firstly, the strength of growth in this Period is weaker when compared to 
the previous decade. Secondly, the dramatic fluctuations of both growth and wage rates 
could not have been the objective of any good policy.  
An inclusive growth model is one that increases per capita incomes without the 
simultaneous increase of income disparities, while safe guarding the gains from 
improved distribution of income in times of poor growth. From this perspective, 
Guyana’s recent growth explosion is not inclusive, although the two previous decades 
point to the contrary. But an inclusive growth model must produce sustainable growth, 
this point is lacking in the two previous decades.  
5   Why did Inequality decline and then reversed? 
To answer this question we need to take a closer look at the sources of growth in 
Guyana and the nexus between these and the services sector. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate 
the growth rates of the non-services and services sectors respectively, for the years 
1990-2009. The author proposes that the source of growth in Guyana is the mining and 
quarrying sector and this causes spillover effects into the services industry. The source 
of the recent increase of inequality lie in this causation mechanism, but this will be made 
clear shortly.  
 
Figure 2. Growth Rates of Non-Services Sectors at 1988 Prices 
 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
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Figure 3. Growth Rates of Services at 1988 Prices 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
Note carefully in Figure 2, two episodes of growth booms (1992 & 2006) in the 
mining and quarrying sector. It is clear that these twin episodes were not only short 
lived, but also collapsed. Remarkably, in the period of 1995 to 2005 growth is this sector 
collapsed to negative values. To prove our causation mechanism, we must expect a 
similar growth pattern for the services sector in Figure 3. The escalation in growth rates 
for the services sector mirror the twin boom periods in the mining and quarrying sector. 
Similarly, growth in the services industry also collapsed, mimicking the twin collapses in 
the mining sector. But there is an important difference with the collapses in the rate of 
growth of the services sector: they do not immediately follow collapses in mining; there 
is a time lag between the collapses in the services industry and the mining and 
quarrying sectors. And finally, the period of continuous deceleration (1995-2005) in the 
mining and quarrying sector transitions to unstable growth in the services sector over 
the same period.  
It is obvious that a collapse in the rate of growth of the mining sector will take 
time to work its way into the services industry, which explains the time lag in collapse 
between the two. This means that growth in the overall economy does not immediately 
follow a collapse in the rate of growth of the mining sector since growth continues for a 
short period in the services industry. The essential point is that the growth and profit 
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rate of the mining and quarrying sector regulates the performance of all other sectors, 
especially the services industry.   
Note carefully that the period of negative growth in the mining and quarrying 
sector (1995-2005) is also Period C - Genuine reductions of inequality: Good luck or 
Good Policy? Since growth rates were stagnant for most sectors and negative in the 
mining and quarrying sector (see Figure 2), it follows that profit rates were stagnant for 
most sectors and negative for the mining and quarrying industry. Hence, there is little 
surprise that inequality declined in Period C. This strengthens the view that reductions 
of inequality in this period have more to do with good luck than good policy: surely; 
stagnant and negative profit rates are not consistent with any good economic policy. 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the profit rates for the various industries and line A-B depicts 
the dramatic decline in profit rates in the mining and quarrying sector.  
 
Figure 4. Profit Rates of Non-Services Sectors at 1988 Prices 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
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Figure 5. Profit Rates of the Services Sector at 1988 Prices 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
Stagnation, upsurge and collapse characterize the profit rates for these sectors in 
the period of 1990-2009. The decline of inequality in this period is simply the outcome of 
poor and unsustainable growth (that led to the collapse and stagnation of profitability), 
instead of two decades of inclusive growth. The reverse is also true: a boom in the 
mining sector that is sustained will lead to sustained growth in the services industry and 
sustained profitability in all sectors. 
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Figure 6. Growth Rates of Non-Services Sectors at 2006 Prices 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
 
Figure 7. Growth Rates of the Services Sector at 2006 Prices 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
Figure 6 highlights a third mining boom in 2010 that corresponds to an equivalent 
boom in the services sector in the same year (see Figure 7). Unlike previous mining and 
quarrying booms, this one remains steady in spite of a decline in growth rates – note, 
that this decline is not a collapse like previous booms. Consequently, growth is steady 
and healthy in the services sector, which validates the line of causation from the mining 
and quarrying industry to the services sector. A sustained gold boom leads to sustained 
profitability in all sectors, especially services, and this increases inequality. See Figures 
8 and 9 for profit rates.  
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Figure 8. Profit Rates of Non-Services Sectors at 2006 Prices 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
 
Figure 9. Profit Rate of the Services Sector at 2006 Prices 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
But this increase of inequality is not because of sustained profitability per se, 
rather, sustained profitability in the services sector in Guyana. Simply put, growth in the 
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services sector is not employment intensive - profits appropriate most of the gains in 
income. This is why inequality rises when growth and profits are sustained in the non-
tradable services sector. The nexus between the mining sector and the services 
industry should be no mystery: mining activities require intermediate goods that can be 
sourced from importation; this gives rise to wholesale and retail sub-sectors. Increased 
transportation by air, water and land is directly connected to the mining and quarrying 
industry. Increases in construction are related to the government’s housing program, but 
also to increased demand for construction by traders in the services sector that wish to 
capitalize on the mining boom. Wholesale and retail services are also linked to the 
government housing program and not just importation of intermediate goods for the 
mining industry. Notwithstanding this, Figures 2, 3, 8 and 9 suggest that the growth in 
the services industry is more correlated with mining booms than with the government’s 
housing program. 
Growth in the services sub-sectors listed above plus financial services have a 
low employment premium. Consider the following: a wholesale or retail trader has six 
sales girls/boys, an outlet store and one building for storage. A mining boom that leads 
to greater importation does necessarily require ten sales girls/boys and more store 
outlets, though it may or may not necessitate additional storage. But how many 
additional employees are needed to assemble, store and transport new goods? In fact, 
many traders may use their existing six sales boys/girls to undertake the assembling 
and storage. Financial services increase with mining booms: more loans to miners, 
traders in the services sector and contractors and other customers in the construction 
sector. This will require increased monitoring of financial assets, but do you think it 
requires many more financial analysts?  
Growth in construction and transport will inevitably lead to job increases, but how 
many? It takes a handful of workers to build a building and though the excavator 
operator will earn premium wage, his job alone replaces many more potentially 
employable labor. Similarly, growth in ICT and online shopping are hardly labor 
intensive. Consequently, sustained growth in these services sectors or low-wage-low-
employment intensive sectors lead to increased inequality. Ergo, if growth were 
sustained in Periods B and C inequality would have worsened since the low-wage-low-
employment intensive sectors were more prevalent. This begs the following question: Is 
Guyana’s growth model inclusive? A poor growth model is evident when a society’s only 
chance of reducing inequality is with poor growth. Surely, a good and inclusive growth 
model would be one where the gains from a society’s longest period of growth are 
widely shared. 
Figure 10 illustrates the profit rates for the various sub-sectors in the services 
industry; it highlights their oscillation around a horizontal trend during the period that 
inequality has declined (1990-2006). It is clear from the graph that distribution; 
construction, transport and financial services are the leading sub-sectors in the services 
industry - unfortunately, these are low-wage-low-employment intensive sectors. 
Consider Figure 11, it illustrates the evolution of gold prices since 1974 to 2014. Note 
the dramatic change in gold prices since 1992, which coincidentally happens to be the 
year the PPP regime, regains political power. The graph highlights the continuous 
decline in gold prices after 1994, which mirrors the collapse in the rate of growth of the 
mining and quarrying sector. As gold prices accelerated in 2006, the mining sector 
skyrocketed at the same time (see Figure 2), only to decline after the decline in prices in 
2007. As the global prices recovered in 2010 so do growth and profit rates in the mining 
sector, except this time, they have remained high. 
Figure 10. Profit Rates of the Services Sector 
Data Source: Bank of Guyana 
Figure 11. Evolution of Gold Prices: 1974-2014 
Data Source: http://data.okfn.org/data/core/gold-prices 
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6   Conclusion 
The principal contribution of this article is that it provides evidence of recent trends of 
inequality in Guyana, but the article goes beyond this and describes the evolution of 
inequality since 1974 to 2013. This is done within a Kaleckian framework to derive profit 
and wage rates, since recent Gini coefficients data are absent. The evidence implies 
that inequality is on the rise and this calls into question the inclusive nature of Guyana’s 
recent growth boom.  
 The article argues that the mining and quarrying sector regulates Guyana’s growth 
performance and ignites growth in the services industry. Unfortunately, much of the 
latter is made up of non-tradable services and consequently, low-wage-low-employment 
opportunities. Thus, a greater share of the gains in income in these low-wage-low-
employment sectors go to profits when growth is sustained. This parallels the jobless 
recovery in the advanced countries since the great recession - growth performance of 
this nature increases inequality.  
This in turn adversely affects the future growth cycle: it increases household 
indebtedness, intensify migration, unemployment and underemployment, reduce 
savings, increase crime and exacerbate labour market mismatches etc. When the initial 
levels of inequality and unemployment are less than socially acceptable, increased 
inequality results in a fractured society.  
References 
DaCosta, M. (2007), “Colonial origins, institutions and economic performance in the 
Caribbean: Guyana and Barbados”, IMF Working Paper WP/07/43, International 
Monetary Fund. 
Gafar, J. (2004), “Income distribution, inequality and poverty during economic reforms in 
Guyana”, Journal of Developing Areas, 38 (1): 55-77.  
 
Grenade, K. and Lewis-Bynoe, D. (2011), “Reflecting on Development Outcomes: A 
Comparative Analysis of Barbados and Guyana”. Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, 
36 (1): 21-42. 
Grenade, K. and Pasha S., (2011), “Guyana’s Recent Growth Turnaround: Good Luck 
or Good Policy or Both?” Caribbean Development Bank. 
Herndon, T; Ash, M and Pollin, R. (2013) “Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle 
Economic Growth? A Critque of Reinhart and Rogoff”. Political Economy of Research 
Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 
Kalecki, M. (1942) “A Theory of Profits” The Economic Journal 52 No. 206/7 pp. 258-
267. 
Keynes, J. (1930) “The Treatise on Money”. Vol 1. London: Macmillan. 
Khemraj, T. (2009), “The Missing Link: The Finance-Growth Nexus and the Guyanese 
Growth Stagnation” Social and Economic Studies, 57(3&4): 105-129. 
Khemraj, T. (2013), “Bi-Communalism and Economic Origins of Democracy: A Case 
Study”. Institute of Development Studies, University of Guyana Special Series Working 
Paper # 4/12 to commemorate the 50th Anniversary (1963-2013) of the University of 
Guyana. 
Marx, K. (1990) [1867] “Capital”, Volume 1. Trans. Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin 
Books. 
Pasha, S; Khemraj, T & Singh, D. (2013), “Sectoral Production Interactions and 
Spillovers in Guyana”. Institute of Development Studies, University of Guyana Special 
Series Working Paper # 2/12 to commemorate the 50th Anniversary (1963-2013) of the 
University of Guyana.  
Piketty, T, “Capital in the 21st Century”, Belknap Press; First Edition, (2014). 
Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K. (2010), “Growth in a Time of Debt”.  American Economic 
Review 100 (2): 573-78.  
Singh, D. (2013), “The Political Economy of Growth: Why Guyana Fell behind? A 
Growth Analysis of the Post-Independence Period”. Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Guyana Special Series Working Paper # 11/12 to commemorate the 50th 
Anniversary of the University of Guyana. 
Staritz, C., Atoyan, R. and Gold, J. 2007 “Guyana: why has growth stopped? An 
empirical study on the stagnation of economic growth”, IMF Working Paper WP/07/86, 
International Monetary Fund. 
Stiglitz, J and Weiss, A. (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”. 
The American Economic Review, 7, No. 3, pp. 393-410.  
Stiglitz, J. (2012) “The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our 
Future”. W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
